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  An integrated risk management is a process, which enables banks to measure and manage all 
risks, simultaneously. The recent turbulent chaos on banking industry has increase the relative 
importance of risk management, more than before. This paper investigates the relationship 
between credit risk and liquidity risk among Iranian banks. The proposed study includes all 
private and governmental banks as population over the period 2005-2012.  The results Pearson 
correlation has disclosed a positive and meaningful relationship between credit and liquidity 
risks. Bank size also impacts on two mentioned risk factors but we there seems to be no 
relationship between financial chaos and type of ownership with risk factors.            
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1. Introduction 
 
During the past two decades, there have been significant changes on banking industry in the world 
due to financial crisis in this sector in 2008 (Lando, 2009; Fiordelisi et al., 2010). Many banking 
officials attempt to put more restrictions on giving loan to business owners in an attempt to prevent 
any trouble making issue. There are also various studies on relationship between different banks’ 
characteristics such as size, market capitalization, etc. (Wong et al., 2008). Salas and Saurina (2002), 
for instance, investigated credit risk in two institutional regimes by studying two Spanish commercial 
and savings banks.  Dičevska (2012) performed an investigation on credit risk and established a 
system for credit risk management in changing economic conditions in Macedonian banks.  
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Cifuentes et al. (2005) investigated liquidity risk in a system of interconnected financial institutions 
when these institutions were under regulatory solvency constraints and marked their assets to market. 
According to their survey, when the market's demand for illiquid assets was less than perfectly 
elastic, sales by distressed institutions depressed the market prices of such assets. They studied the 
theoretical basis for contagious failures, quantified them through simulation exercises and reported 
that liquidity requirements on institutions could be as efficient as capital requirements in forestalling 
contagious failures. 
 
Michalak and Uhde (2012) provided some empirical evidence that credit risk securitization had a 
negative effect on the issuing banks’ financial soundness. For this purpose, they used a unique sample 
of 749 cash and synthetic securitization transactions issued by 60 stock-listed bank holdings in the 
EU-13 plus Switzerland over the period over the period 1997-2007. They reported a negative 
influence of securitization on bank profitability and capital environment as well as a positive 
relationship between securitization and the issuing bank's return volatility. They underlined that the 
decision by the Basel Committee to enhance the new Basel III framework in the field of securitization 
was a step in the right direction. 
 
2. The proposed study  
 
The proposed study of this paper considers the effects of three variables, namely ownership type, 
bank size and financial crises on two risk components including credit and liquidity risks. Fig. 1. 
shows details of our proposed model.  
 
  
Fig. 1. The proposed framework of the study  
 
According to Fig. 1 all components are calculated as follows,  
 
Liquidity risk: This ratio is calculated as follows,   
 
Liquidity risk (LR) = [(Demand Deposits + Transaction Deposits + Brokered Deposits + NOW 
Accounts + Unused Loan Commitments)-(Cash  + Currency & Coin + Trading Assets + Fed Funds 
Purchased + Commercial Paper + Securities available for Sale ) ± Net Inter-Bank Lending Position  
± Net Inter-Bank Acceptances ± Net Derivative Position]/Total Assets  
Bank size  
Liquidity risk
 
Financial crises  
Ownership  
  Credit riskH. Nikomaram et al. / Management Science Letters 3 (2013) 
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Any positive value for liquidity risk (LR) indicates that bank cannot guarantee incidents.   
 
Berger-Bouwman (BB) measure  
 
Berger-Bouwman (BB) factor is calculated as Cat Fat/Total Assets while credit risk (CR) is measured 
as follows,  
 
ln( / ) Z Score ROA CR ROA CAP    ,   
 
where ROA is return on assets, CAP represents the ratio of total equities on total assets and σROA is the 
standard deviation of ROA. Obviously, the higher value represents the higher risk. Credit risk (CR) 
ratio can also be calculated as follows, 
 
tt
t-1
Loan charfe -Offs  Loan Recoveries
Credit Risk (CR)=
Loan Loss Allowance
 , 
Z-Score
ROA
ROA+ Capital ratio
CR =ln

 
In this study, bank ownership is a dummy variable, which is equal to zero for governmental banks 
and one for private banks. Bank size is also calculated by taking the log of total assets and Financial 
crises is also a dummy variable, which is equal to zero when there is no crises and one during the 
financial turbulence. In our study, there were 144 observations and 45.8% of the data were associated 
with governmental banks while 54.2% of the observations were associated with private banks. In 
addition, 37.5% of the observations belong to before crisis and 62.5% of the data were associated 
with after crisis. Table 1 demonstrates some basic statistics on bank size. 
 
Table 1 
Basic statistics associated with bank size 
             Deviations 
Independent 
variable 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Variance Skewness Kurtisos Skewness Kurtisos 
Bank size  144  11.18  1.47  2.16  -0.39499  -0.532  -1.955  -1.325 
 
According to the results of Table 1, there are 144 observations where banks-size maintains an average 
of 11.18 with standard deviation of 1.47 and standard deviation of 2.161 and it seems to be normally 
distributed. Table 2 demonstrates the results of CRz-score, 
 
Table 2 
Basic statistics associated with CRz-score 
            Deviations 
Independent 
variable 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Variance Skewness Kurtisos Skewness Kurtisos 
CRz-score  144  2.390  1.016  1.034  0.143  2.239  0.711  5.826 
 
The results of Table 2 indicate that data do not seem to be normally distributed. Table 3 shows similar 
results for CR variable.  
   
Table 3 
Basic statistics associated with CR 
            Deviations 
Independent 
variable 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Variance Skewness Kurtisos Skewness Kurtisos 
CR  117  2.430  4.445  23.336  4.856  26.231  21.717  59.119   1226
The results of Table 3 for CR indicate that the results are away from  normal distribution.  Table 4 
presents the same descriptive results for variable LR and we could make similar conclusion that LR 
was not normally distributed.  
 
Table 4 
Basic statistics associated with LR 
            Deviations 
Independent 
variable 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Variance Skewness Kurtisos Skewness Kurtisos 
LR  114  -0.26  0.283  0.052  -1.188  0.742  -5.884  1.850 
 
In order to have a better understanding on the nature of data, we use Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests and Table 5 demonstrates the results of our experiment for 144 observations.  
 
Table 5 
The results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests 
Shapiro-Wilk   Kolmogorov-Smirnov   Variable Sig.   Stat.   Sig.   Stat.  
.021   .974   .193   .072   Bank size
.000   .947   .003   .105   CRZ-Score  
.000   .389 .000 .310   CR
.000   .812   .000   .179   LR  
.000   .703   .000   .326   LRBB
As we can observe from the results of Table 5, only bank size is normally distributed and other 
variables are not normally distributed when the level of significance is five percent.  
 
2.1. The relationship between credit and liquidity risks 
 
In this section, we present details of our findings for the relationships between different variables 
based on Pearson correlation ratios. Table 6 demonstrates the results of our survey. 
 
Table 6 
The summary of statistical observations for the implementation of Pearson correlation ratio 
CRZ-Score   CR   LR   LRBB     Variable  
1  -.211  -.194  -.179  Pearson correlation   
  .022  .020  .032  P-value  CRZ-Score 
144  117  144  144  No.   
-.211  1  .201  .259
   Pearson correlation   
.022    .030  .005  P-value  CR 
117 117  117 117 No.   
-.194 .201
   1 .406
  Pearson correlation   
.020  .030    .000  P-value  LR 
144  117  144  144  No.   
-.179  .259
    .406  1  Pearson correlation   
.032  .005  .000    P-value  LRBB 
144  117  144  144  No.   
 
In this study credit risk is measured based on two attributes of CR and CRz-score. In addition, 
liquidity risk is calculated based on two attributes of LR and LRBB. Based on the results of Table 6, 
we can observe that there is a meaning and reverse relationship between CRz-score and LR when the 
level of significance is five percent. There are also meaningful and reverse relationships between 
CRz-score and LR, between CRz-score and LR, when the level of significance is five percent. 
However, the relationship between CR and LR and between CR and LRBB are meaningful but 
positive when the level of significance is five percent.  
 
 H. Nikomaram et al. / Management Science Letters 3 (2013) 
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2.2.The results of Pearson correlation with bank size as control variable 
 
We have accomplished the same results as explained in previous section when there is an additional 
variable, bank size, and Table 7 demonstrates the results of our survey. 
 
Table 7 
The results of Pearson correlation ratios 
Bank size        
CRZ-Score   CR   LR   LRBB     Variable  
1.000  -.203  -.062  -.046  Pearson correlation   
.  .029  .510  .626  P-value  CRZ-Score 
0  114  114  114  No.   
-.203  1.000  .193  .281  Pearson correlation   
.029  .  .038  .002  P-value  CR 
114  0  114  114  No.   
-.062  .193  1.000  .467  Pearson correlation   
.510  .038  .  .000  P-value  LR 
114  114  0  114  No.   
-.046  .281  .467  1.000  Pearson correlation   
.626  .002  .000  .  P-value  LRBB 
114  114  114  0  No.   
 
The results of Table 7 show that in the presence of bank size, the relationship between CRz-score and 
LR is reduced from -0.194 to -0.062 and although the relationship is still negative but it is not 
statistically significance. The same result holds for the relationship between CRz-score and LRBB and 
we observe that the relationship is reduced from -0.179 to -0.046 but it is not statistically significance. 
However, the positive relationship between CR and LRBB has been increase from 0.259 to 0.281 and 
it is still significant even when the level of significance is one percent.  
 
2.3. The results of Pearson correlation ratio for credit and liquidity risks between private and 
governmental banks 
 
Table 8 
The results of Pearson correlation ratios for private and governmental ownership  
Ownership           
CRZ-Score   CR   LR   LRBB        
1 -.191  -.270 -.326 Pearson correlation   
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
 
  .162  .028  .008  P-value  CRZ-Score 
66  55  66  66  No.   
-.191  1  .220  .052  Pearson correlation   
.162    .107  .707  P-value  CR 
55  55  55  55  No.   
-.270  .220  1  .812  Pearson correlation   
.028  .107    .000  P-value  LR 
66  55  66  66  No.   
-.326  .052  .812  1  Pearson correlation   
.008  .707  .000    P-value  LRBB 
66  55  66  66  No.   
1  -.229  -.134  -.095  Pearson correlation   
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
  .073  .243  .410  P-value  CRZ-Score 
78  62  78  78  No.   
-.229  1  .159  .0415  Pearson correlation   
.073    .216  .001  P-value  CR 
62  62  62  62  No.   
-.134 .159  1 .198 Pearson correlation   
.243  .216    .083  P-value  LR 
78  62  78  78  No.   
-.095  .415  .198  1  Pearson correlation   
.410  .001  .083    P-value  LRBB 
78  62  78  78  No.     1228
The results of Table 8 show that the relationship between CRz-score and LR is negative for 
governmental banks and it is statistically significance when the level of significance is five percent. 
In addition, the relationship between CRz-score and LR is negative for private banks but it is not 
statistically significance when the level of significance is five percent.  There is also a negative and 
meaningful relationship between CRz-score and LRBB between governmental banks when the level of 
significance is one percent. Despite the fact that the same relationship holds for governmental banks, 
the relationship is not statistically significance.  The relationship between CR and LR is positive in 
governmental and private banks but it is not statistically significance. Finally, in spite the fact that the 
relationship between CR and LRBB is not statistically significance for governmental banks, it is 
statistically significance for private banks. In order to compare the relative effect of various factors 
between governmental and private banks we have calculated Fisher correlation ratio based on the 
following  
 
    = (   	 −    )/	 (1/   −3 )+( 1 /     −3 )  
The result of Table 9, none of z value is not statistically significance leaving us to conclude that 
ownership type does not play an important role on different risk components.  
 
Table 9  
Statistical observations for z value  
Z    Fisher    Pearson correlation    Number      
   Gov.    Private    Gov.    Private    Gov.    Private      
0.792868  0.2693  0.1338  -0.27  -0.134  66  78  LR with CRz-score   
1.350508  0.3261  0.0953  -0.326  -0.095  66  78  LRBB with CRz-score   
0.327007  0.2205  0.1583  0.22  0.159  55  62  CR with LR   
-1.90999  0.052  0.4153  0.052  0.415  55  62  CR with LRBB   
 
2.4 The results of Pearson correlation before and after crises  
 
Table10 
The results of Pearson correlation ratios before and after crisis  
Ownership           
CRZ-Score   CR   LR   LRBB        
1  -.006  -.367  -.085  Pearson correlation   
B
e
f
o
r
e
 
c
r
i
s
i
s
 
  .972  .006  .541  P-value  CRZ-Score 
54  35  54  54  No.   
-.006 1  .448 .140 Pearson correlation   
.972    .007  .421  P-value  CR 
35  35  35  35  No.   
-.367  .448  1  .306  Pearson correlation   
.006  .007    .025  P-value  LR 
54  35  54  54  No.   
-.085  .140  .306  1  Pearson correlation   
.541 .421  .025 P-value  LRBB 
54  35  54  54  No.   
1  -.236  -.135  -.205  Pearson correlation   
A
f
t
e
r
 
c
r
i
s
i
s
 
  .033  .205  .052  P-value  CRZ-Score 
90  82  90  90  No.   
-.236  1  .164  .277  Pearson correlation   
.033    .141  .012  P-value  CR 
82  82  82  82  No.   
-.135  .164  1  .444  Pearson correlation   
.205  .141    .000  P-value  LR 
90 82  90 90 No.   
-.205  .277  .444  1  Pearson correlation   
.052  .012  .000    P-value  LRBB 
90  82  90  90  No.   H. Nikomaram et al. / Management Science Letters 3 (2013) 
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According to the results of Table 10, there is a reverse and meaningful relationship between CRz-
score and LR before crisis when the level of significance is one percent but this relationship is not 
statistically significance after crisis. The relationship between CRz-score and LRBB is not significance 
either before or after the crisis. The relationship between CR and LR is positive and meaningful 
before crisis but it is not meaningful after crisis.  The relationship between CR and LRBB is not 
statistically significance before crisis but it is statistically significance after crisis happens.  
 
In order to compare the relative effect of various factors between governmental and private banks we 
have calculated Fisher correlation ratio based on the following  
 
    = (   	 −    )/	 (1/   −3 )+( 1 /     −3 )  
The results of Table 11, none of z values is not statistically significance leaving us to conclude that 
crisis does not play an important role on different risk components.  
 
Table 11  
Statistical observations for z value before and after crisis  
Z    Fisher    Pearson correlation    Number      
   After    Before    After    Before    After    Before      
1.412469  0.3849  0.1358  -0.135  -0.367  90  54  LR with CRz-score   
-0.69574  0.0852  0.2079  -0.205  -0.085  90  54  LRBB with CRz-score   
1.511385  0.4822  0.1655  0.164  0.448  82  35  CR with LR   
-0.68482  0.1409  0.2844  0.277  0.14  82  35  CR with LRBB   
 
3. The results   
In this section, we summarize the results of our survey for four hypotheses of this survey. Next, we 
first present the results of our investigation on four various types of hypotheses.  
3.1. The results of testing four hypotheses  
3.1.1 The first hypothesis: The relationship between credit and liquidity risk components  
The first hypothesis of this survey considers whether there is a positive and meaningful relationship 
between credit and liquidity risk. The following summarizes the results of our survey,  
  ≤0
 >0
		   ,        	=	−0.194	,   = 0.02	,     =0 . 0 2<     =0 . 0 5  
As we can observe from the results, there is a meaningful relationship between these two variables, 
the negative sign is consistent with our hypothesis since a reduction in risk will increase the credit 
and we can confirm the first hypothesis. Similarly, we perform the following test between two 
variables LRBB and Z-score as follows, 
  ≤0
 >0
		   ,        	=	−0.179	,   = 0.03	,     =0 . 0 3<     =0 . 0 5  
As we can observe, there are similar results and we can confirm there is a meaningful relationship 
between these two variables when the level of significance is five percent. In addition, the 
relationship between LR and CR as well as between LRBB and CT are  meaningful when the level of 
significance is five percent and the results are summarized as follows, 
  ≤0
 >0
			   ,  	= 	0.201	,   = 0.03	,     =0 . 0 3<     =0 . 0 5    1230
  ≤0
 >0
			   ,   	= 	0.259	,   = 0.005	,     =0 . 0 0 5<     =0 . 0 5  
3.1.2 The second hypothesis: The effect of ownership on the relationship between credit and liquidity 
risk 
The results of investigating the effect of ownership on two risks of LR and CRz-score are examined 
as follows, 
 
   ,       ,            					 			   ,       ,			       
   ,       ,             ≠		    ,       ,			       
			    = 0.792 < 1.96 
The results indicate that ownership does not have any impact on two risks of LR and CRz-score when 
the level of significance is five percent. Similar investigation has been performed between LRBB and 
CRz-score and the result is Zob =1.350 < 1.96 and this confirms that ownership does not have any 
impact on LR and CRz-score when the level of significance is five percent. The same conclusions 
hold for the effect of ownership for the relationships of LR and CR as well as LRBB and CR when the 
level of significance is five percent. In other words, ownership does not play important role on these 
risk components.  
3.1.3 The third hypothesis: The effect of bank size on the relationship between credit and liquidity risk 
The results of investigating the effect of bank size on two risks of LR and CRz-score are examined as 
follows, 
  =0
 ≠0
			   ,      ,			    	    			= −0.062	,  = 0.51	,    =0 . 5 1>     =0 . 0 5  
The result of Pearson correlation ratio does not indicate that bank size has any impact on the 
relationship between LR and CRz-score when the level of significance is five percent. Similarly, the 
results of investigating the effect of bank size on the relationship between LRBB and  CRz-score is 
pob=0.62>poc=0.05, which means there is no meaningful relationship. However, the effect of bank 
size on relationship between CR and LR as well as CR and LRBB are equal to pob=0.03<poc=0.05 and 
pob=0.002<poc=0.05, which means the bank size influences these two pairs of risk factors, 
significantly. 
3.1.4 The fourth hypothesis: The effect of crisis on the relationship between credit and liquidity risk 
The results of investigating the effect of ownership on two risks of LR and CRz-score are examined 
as follows, 
 
   ,       ,      	      				 			   ,       ,			     	      
   ,       ,      	       ≠		    ,       ,			     	      
			    =1 . 4 1<1 . 9 6  
The results indicate that crisis does not have any impact on two risks of LR and CRz-score when the 
level of significance is five percent. Similar investigation has been performed between LRBB and 
CRz-score and the result is Zob =-0.69 < 1.96 and this confirms that crisis does not have any impact 
on LR and CRz-score when the level of significance is five percent. The same conclusions hold for 
the effect of ownership for the relationships of LR and CR as well as LRBB and CR when the level of 
significance is five percent. In other words, crisis does not play important role on these risk 
components.  
3.2. Other results 
We have also performed regression analysis on relationship between the effects of CRz-scor, LRBB, 
LR and CR as independent variables and bank size, crisis and ownership as dependent variables. 
Table 12 shows the results of testing the first regression model where LR is the dependent variable. H. Nikomaram et al. / Management Science Letters 3 (2013) 
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Table 12 
The results of regression analysis for the first model when LR is dependent variable 
Variable  Non-standard coefficients  Standard coefficients   
 B  Standard  dev.  B  t-student  P-value 
Intercept  -.824   .187   -   -4.406   .000  
Ownership .124  .047  .219  2.623  .010  
Crisis  -.031   .048   -.054   -.656   .513  
Bank size  .046  .016  .241  2.867  .005  
 
As we can observe from the results of Table 12, while crisis has not significant impact on LR, 
ownership and bank size have positive and meaningful effects on LR. Similar results are executed on 
the same data where LRBB  is the dependent variable and Table 13 demonstrates the results as follows, 
Table 13 
The results of regression analysis for the first model when LRBB is dependent variable (R-
Square=0.052) 
Variable Non-standard  coefficients  Standard  coefficients   
 B  Standard  dev.  B  t-student  P-value 
Intercept  -1.966   .430     -4.571   .000  
Ownership .021  .108  .016  .189  .850  
Crisis  -.028   .110   -.022   -.259   .796  
Bank size  .102  .037  .234  2.744  .007  
 
The results of Table 13 indicate that only bank size maintains important effect and two other factors, 
ownership and crisis, do not play important role on LRBB. Another investigation is to consider CRz-
score as dependent variable and Table 14 presents details of our findings, 
Table 14 
The results of regression analysis for the first model when CRz-score is dependent variable (R-
Square=0.012) 
Variable  Non-standard coefficients Standard coefficients
 B  Standard  dev.  B  t-student  P-value 
Intercept  3.075   .709     4.337   .000  
Ownership -.056  .179  -.027  -.316  .753  
Crisis  -.157   .181   -.074   -.866   .388  
Bank size  -.049  .061  -.070  -.808  .420  
 
The results of Table 14 also indicate that none of the independent variables has any meaningful 
impact on CRz-score. Finally, we have investigated the impact of dependent variables on CR and 
found out that none of them had any meaningful impact on CR. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have performed an empirical investigation on measuring the effect of some Iranian 
banks on two credit risk factors. The proposed study has used Pearson correlation tests to investigate 
the relationships. We have also considered some linear regression models, where three variables of 
banks size, ownership and financial crisis are considered as independent variable and different risk 
factors were considered as dependent variable. The results of regression analysis have indicated that 
while crisis has not significant impact on LR, ownership and bank size had positive and meaningful 
effects on LR. In addition, only bank size maintained important effect on LRBB and two other factors, 
ownership and crisis, did not play important role on LRBB. Finally, we have investigated the impact of 
dependent variables on CR and found out that none of them had any meaningful impact on CR. 
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